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CITIZENS UNITED AND
CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL
ACTIVISMt
Geoffrey R. Stone*
This Article analyzes the recent trend of conservative judicial ac-
tivism in the Supreme Court and searches for a principled reason to
explain it. The conservative majority has struck down several laws in
recent years, culminating in its invalidation of an important provision
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission. While judicial restraint and
originalism are currently seen as conservative principles, neither prin-
ciple explains these decisions.
The author argues that no principle can explain the results of
these cases-rather, they can only be explained by the Justices' per-
sonal views and policy preferences. The author compares the con-
servative majority's pattern to that of the Warren Court, which largely
invalidated laws only when footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. would dictate that the Court should. Thus,
neither unrestrained judicial activism nor total judicial restraint is ap-
propriate. Instead, the author argues that a selective judicial activism
guided by footnote four is the best approach. The author then con-
cludes that the conservative majority is troubling because it is infusing
its personal policy preferences into its opinions while at the same time
convincing the public that it is acting in a principled manner.
The Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission' provides an interesting entry point for a discussion
of conservative theories of constitutional interpretation. In Citizens
United, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, held unconstitutional a key
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).2
The specific provision the Court invalidated limited the amount of mon-
t This Article was originally presented on March 9, 2011, as the second 2010-2011 lecture of
the David C. Baum Memorial Lectures on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the University of Illinois
College of Law.
* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-155,116 Stat. 81 (2002) (containing the entirety of BCRA).
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ey that corporations could spend in certain circumstances to support or
oppose the election of named candidates for federal office.' The decision
raised fundamental questions about the nature and legitimacy of con-
servative judicial activism.
I. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
To understand Citizens United, it is first necessary to establish the
constitutional context of the decision. In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo,4 the
Supreme Court struck down several provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971.1 In a key part of the Buckley decision, the Court
held that the government cannot constitutionally limit the amount indi-
viduals can spend to support or oppose the election of political candi-
dates. The Court reasoned that because expenditure limitations "limit
political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms,"' they cannot withstand First Amendment scru-
tiny.6
The question later arose whether corporations have the same First
Amendment rights as individuals to spend unlimited amounts of money
in the electoral process. In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce7 that corporations do not have the
same right in this respect as individuals. In a six-to-three decision, the
Court upheld a Michigan statute that limited the amount that corpora-
tions could spend to support or oppose the election of candidates for
state office.8 The Court explained that "the unique legal and economic
characteristics of corporations" -such as "limited liability, perpetual life,
and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of as-
sets"-enable corporations "to use 'resources amassed in the economic
marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political market-
place."' 9 Noting that the Act was designed to deal with "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accu-
mulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas,"
the Court concluded that "the State has articulated a sufficiently compel-
ling rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by
corporations. "10
3. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). The Act also limited labor unions, but for the sake of simplicity I will
refer only to corporations.
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
5. Id. at 58 (invalidating 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(a), (c), (e)(1)).
6. Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
7. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
8. Id. at 659-60.
9. Id. at 658-59 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)).
10. Id. at 660.
(Vol. 2012
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The Court adhered to this view for the next twenty years. In 2003,
for example, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission," the Court
upheld the same provision of the BCRA that it later invalidated in Citi-
zens United. In McConnell, in a five-to-four decision, the Court followed
Austin and held that the provision of the 2002 legislation that limited the
amount that corporations could spend in the political process did not vio-
late the First Amendment.12 The Court reaffirmed that government's
"power to prohibit corporations.., from using funds in their treasuries
to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of
candidates ... has been firmly embedded in our law."' 3
In the seven years between McConnell and Citizens United, it be-
came clear that the positions of the Justices on this question were fixed in
stone. Beginning with Austin, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
voted consistently, in dissent, to protect what they saw as the First
Amendment rights of corporations, without regard to precedent, and af-
ter joining the Court in 2005 and 2006, respectively, Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito quickly made clear that they too were in that
camp.' 4 As Lillian BeVier astutely observed at the time:
[D]ebate on these issues has reached an impasse.... [T]he chasm
that separates the Justices from one another appears unbridgea-
ble.... There would seem to be little if anything that could be said
and little if any evidence that could be marshaled, by either side,
which would stand much of a chance of persuading those on the
other to reconsider their positions. 5
Sure enough, in Citizens United, the Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, overruled Austin and McConnell and held that corporations, like
individuals, have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited funds in
order to elect or defeat particular political candidates. 6 Predictably, the
five Justices in the majority were Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito.17 The only "relevant" change in the seven years since McConnell
was that Justice O'Connor (who had voted with the majority in
McConnell) had been replaced by Justice Alito. In short, the substitu-
tion of Justice Alito for Justice O'Connor switched the majority on the
issue. 8
11. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
12. Id. at 204.
13. Id. at 203.
14. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
15. Lillian R. BeVier, Full of Surprises-and More to Come: Randall v. Sorrell, the First
Amendment, and Campaign Finance Regulation, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 195-96.
16. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
17. Id.
18. Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist, but because Justice Rehnquist had dis-
sented in McConnell, this did not affect the vote in Citizens United. See id. (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., majority opinion); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114, 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
No. 2]
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Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Citizens
United, reiterated the arguments of the dissenters in the earlier cases, de-
claring, for example, that "[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it
prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citi-
zens, for simply engaging in political speech," 19 that even though corpora-
tions are granted special powers and prerogatives to enable them to func-
tion efficiently as economic entities, "'[i]t is rudimentary that the State
cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of
First Amendment rights, '' 20 that corporations should not "be treated dif-
ferently under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not 'natu-
ral persons,""'2 and that when the government seeks "to command where
a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or
she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought."22 Such "thought
control," Justice Kennedy concluded, is "unlawful," because the "First
Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves."2 3
II. CRITICISM OF CITIZENS UNITED
Citizens United has been criticized on a variety of grounds. For
purposes of this Article, the most interesting criticisms suggest, not that
the majority was necessarily wrong on the merits of the First Amend-
ment issue (although the decision surely has been criticized on those
grounds),24 but that the conservative Justices who made up the majority
behaved disingenuously in their handling of the case. At least three rea-
sons exist for this accusation.
First, there is the issue of precedent. In theory, at least, "conserva-
tive" Justices claim to be respectful of stare decisis. Indeed, that is part
of what it has traditionally meant to be conservative. Yet, in this in-
stance, there were two definitive decisions of the Supreme Court in the
twenty years leading up to Citizens United-Austin and McConnell-in
which the Court had held unequivocally that government can constitu-
tionally limit corporate political expenditures, and in which the Court
had emphatically and unequivocally rejected the arguments of the dis-
senting Justices in those cases, arguments that, essentially unchanged,
carried the day in Citizens United. Although the majority made a half-
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
20. Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
21. Id. at 900.
22. Id. at 908.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., id. at 948-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Robert L. Kerr,
What Justice Powell and Adam Smith Could Have Told the Citizens United Majority About Other
People's Money, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 211 (2010); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good
Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010); Monica Youn, First
Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 137-38
(2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach in Citizens United is "profoundly at odds" with the
approach underlying much campaign finance doctrine).
(Vol. 2012
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hearted effort to legitimize its decision to overrule those recent prece-
dents,25 the plain and simple fact is that nothing had really changed in the
intervening years -except the makeup of the Court itself. Conservatives,
who have long touted themselves as respectful of precedent, stability,
and tradition, were therefore fair game for those critics who gleefully
lambasted them for their seeming hypocrisy in overruling a line of im-
portant recent decisions, the results of which they simply did not like.26
Second, there is the issue of judicial overreaching. Both Citizens
United and the Solicitor General offered the Court several ways to re-
solve the case in favor of Citizens United without requiring the Court
even to consider the continuing vitality of Austin and McConnell. These
included, for example, a quite plausible statutory interpretation argu-
ment that the specific speech at issue in Citizens United did not even vio-
late BCRA27 and an equally credible argument that the challenged provi-
sion was unconstitutional as applied to Citizens United because Citizens
United is a nonprofit corporation and thus in a very different position
constitutionally in terms of need for the limitation on corporate spending
than for-profit corporations such as Exxon Mobile, General Electric, and
Pfizer.2 Had the majority resolved the case in any of these alternative
ways, it would not have addressed the broader and much more contro-
versial constitutional question it did.
Traditionally, conservatives have insisted that courts should resolve
constitutional controversies on narrow rather than broad grounds and
should avoiding holding laws unconstitutional unless there is no other
way to dispose of the case. In Citizens United, however, the conservative
Justices eschewed the narrow grounds of decision that were available to
them, even those suggested by Citizens United itself, and actually or-
dered the parties to file briefs on the much broader and more controver-
sial question of whether Austin and McConnell should be overruled.29
Because this sort of aggressive overreaching has traditionally been dis-
dained by conservatives, the Court's performance in Citizens United was
fair and easy game for those who condemned the majority's evident ea-
gerness to reach out unnecessarily to pronounce the limit on corporate
spending unconstitutional.
25. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911-13; id. at 919-24 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
26. My own view is that stare decisis is important to the rule of law, but that Justices should be
free to overrule prior decisions if there are persuasive jurisprudential reasons for overruling. See
Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, The Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 71-73 (1988); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and
the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008). In Citizens United, though, there
were no such reasons.
27. See Brief for Appellants at 34-41, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (No. 08-205) (Hilary: The Movie is not the functional equivalent of express advocacy.).
28. See id. at 31 (arguing that, unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofit advocacy groups do not
pose a danger of corruption).
29. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (mem.).
No. 21
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Third, there is the question of judicial activism versus judicial re-
straint. This is, for me, the most intriguing facet of the decision in Citi-
zens United. How should courts decide how much deference or how
much scrutiny is appropriate in considering the constitutionality of gov-
ernment action? That is the central question of U.S. constitutional law,
at least insofar as courts are concerned. In the last half-century, con-
servatives have derided judicial activism as illegitimate and called for a
more restrained exercise of the power of judicial review. In Citizens
United, however, the conservative majority embraced an aggressively ac-
tivist approach, disregarding an effort by our nation's elected officials to
bring order to what they regarded as a dangerously out-of-control elec-
toral process." The stakes were clearly high, and members of Congress
and the President (Bush II, by the way) obviously have a high degree of
expertise in such matters. Why, then, did the conservative Justices not
exercise restraint and defer to the judgment of our elected leaders? This
is the question to which I now turn.
III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VERSUS JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
It is often assumed that liberals like judicial activism and conserva-
tives like judicial restraint. It is not so simple. For one thing, judicial ac-
tivism and judicial restraint do not necessarily correlate with liberal and
conservative outcomes. For example, on such questions as the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action, regulations of commercial advertising, gun
control laws, and campaign finance regulation, judicial restraint would
lead to politically "liberal" results, and judicial activism would produce
politically "conservative" results. Not surprisingly then, at some times in
our history, judicial activism has been embraced by conservatives and
criticized by liberals, and at other times, judicial activism has been em-
braced by liberals and criticized by conservatives.
In the early years of the twentieth century, for example, conserva-
tive Justices employed an aggressive form of judicial activism to invali-
date a broad range of progressive legislation. During the Lochner era,"
which lasted for some forty years,32 the Supreme Court invoked "eco-
nomic substantive due process" in the name of protecting the "liberty of
contract" to invalidate more than 150 state and federal laws regulating
such matters as child labor, the insurance industry, banks, minimum
wages, maximum hours, the rights of labor, and the transportation indus-
30. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress crafted BCRA in re-
sponse to a virtual mountain of research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to avert.
The Court now negates Congress' efforts .... ).
31. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. The era is generally said to have begun with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and
ended with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Howard J. Vogel, The "Ordered Lib-
erty" of Substantive Due Process and the Future of Constitutional Law As a Rhetorical Art: Variations
on a Theme from Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1481 n.45
(2007).
[Vol. 2012
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try.33 Progressive critics of the Lochner-era jurisprudence, like Felix
Frankfurter, concluded that judicial activism was presumptively illegiti-
mate and unwarranted. 34 The only principled stance for a responsible
Justice, he argued, was judicial restraint.3" Building on the experience of
the Lochner era, political liberals maintained that judicial activism was
dangerous because it invited Justices to substitute their own personal
values and preferences for those of the majority, as reflected in the out-
comes of the political process. 36
Other critics of Lochner, however, took away a very different les-
son. In their view, Lochner was wrong not because judicial activism is
wrong but because Lochner was not an appropriate situation for judicial
activism. It was this view that Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone set forth
in 1938 in his famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.37 While burying the doctrine of economic substantive due process,
Stone at the same time suggested that "[t]here may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation...
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or when it discriminates
"against discrete and insular minorities" in circumstances in which it is
reasonable to infer that prejudice, intolerance or indifference might seri-
ously have curtailed "the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities."38
This conception of selective judicial activism is deeply rooted in the
original understanding of the essential purpose of judicial review in our
system of constitutional governance. The Framers of our Constitution
wrestled with the problem of how to cabin the dangers of overbearing
and intolerant majorities. For example, those who initially opposed a bill
of rights argued that a list of rights would serve little, if any, practical
purpose, for in a self-governing society, the majority could simply disre-
gard whatever rights might be "guaranteed" in the Constitution.39 In the
face of strenuous objections from the Antifederalists during the ratifica-
tion debates, however, it became necessary to reconsider the issue.
On December 20, 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison
from Paris that, after reviewing the proposed Constitution, he regretted
"the omission of a bill of rights."4 In response, Madison expressed doubt
33. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (minimum wage); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (child labor); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80
(1908) ("yellow-dog contracts"); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (maximum hours).
34. See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 101 (2010).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 111.
37. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
38. Id. at 152 n.4.
39. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in JACK N. RAKOVE,
DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 160, 161 (1998).
40. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in RAKOVE, supra note 39,
at 154, 156.
No. 21
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that a bill of rights would "provide any check on the passions and inter-
ests of the popular majorities."'" He maintained that "experience proves
the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its contro[l] is
most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have
been committed by overbearing majorities in every State" that already
had a bill of rights.42 In such circumstances, he asked, "What use.., can
a bill of rights serve in popular [g]overnments?"43
Jefferson replied, "Your thoughts on the subject of the Declaration
of rights. .. omit one [argument] which has great weight with me, the le-
gal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body,
which if rendered independent.., merits great confidence for their
learning [and] integrity."" This exchange apparently carried some
weight with Madison. On June 8, 1789, Madison proposed the Bill of
Rights to the House of Representatives. At the outset, he reminded his
colleagues that "the greatest danger" to liberty was found "in the body of
the people, operating by the majority against the minority."45 Echoing
Jefferson's letter, he stated the position for judicial review, contending
that if these rights are:
incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice
will consider themselves.., the guardians of those rights; they will
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitu-
tion by the declaration of rights.4 6
This reliance on judges, whose lifetime tenure would hopefully insu-
late them from the need to curry favor with the governing majority, was
central to the Framers' understanding. Alexander Hamilton, for exam-
ple, strongly endorsed judicial review as obvious and uncontroversial. 7
The "independence of the judges," he reasoned, is "requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humours, which.., sometimes disseminate among the people them-
selves .... "I Judges, he insisted, have a duty to resist invasions of consti-
tutional rights even if they are "instigated by the major voice of the
community."49
It was this "originalist" conception of judicial review that informed
the Warren Court's selective judicial activism. As a rule, the Warren
41. RAKOVE, supra note 39, at 159.
42. Letter from James Madison, supra note 39, at 161.
43. Id. at 162.
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in RAKOVE, supra note 39,
at 165,165.
45. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James Madi-
son).
46. Id. at 457.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 236 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009).
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id. at 238-39.
[Vol. 2012
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Court gave a great deal of deference to the elected branches of govern-
ment-except when such deference would effectively abdicate the re-
sponsibility the Framers had imposed upon the judiciary to serve as an
essential check against the inherent dangers of democratic
majoritarianism. They therefore invoked activist judicial review primari-
ly in two situations: (1) when the governing majority systematically dis-
regarded the interests of a historically underrepresented group (such as
blacks, ethnic minorities, political dissidents, religious dissenters, and
persons accused of crime); and (2) when there was a risk that a governing
majority was using its authority to stifle its critics, entrench the political
status quo, and/or perpetuate its own political power.
Consider, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, which prohib-
ited racial segregation in public schools; 0 Loving v. Virginia, which inval-
idated laws forbidding interracial marriage;5 Engel v. Vitale, which pro-
hibited school prayer; 2 Goldberg v. Kelly, which guaranteed a hearing
before an individual's welfare benefits could be terminated;53 Reynolds v.
Sims, which guaranteed "one person, one vote;" Miranda v. Arizona,
which gave effect to the prohibition of compelled self-incrimination;55
Gideon v. Wainwright, which guaranteed all persons accused of crime the
right to effective assistance of counsel;5 6 New York Times v. Sullivan,
which limited the ability of public officials to use libel actions to silence
their critics;57 and Elfbrandt v. Russell, which protected the First
Amendment rights of members of the Communist Party. 8 Each of these
decisions clearly reflected the central purpose of judicial review-to
guard against the distinctive dangers of majoritarian abuse.
By definition, antimajoritarian decisions generally do not sit well
with the majority. It is therefore hardly surprising that this jurisprudence
excited biting criticism, especially in the political arena, where candidates
curry favor with the very same majority whose "unconstitutional" politi-
cal preferences were being thwarted. By the late 1960s, Richard Nixon
was able to make the Court's "judicial activism" a significant issue in na-
tional politics. During his nomination acceptance speech in 1968, for ex-
ample, he insisted that the Court had "gone too far" and that "we must
act to restore" a proper "balance."59 Nixon decried the activism of the
Warren Court and pledged to appoint "strict constructionists" rather
50. 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
51. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
52. 370 U.S. 421,433 (1962).
53. 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970).
54. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
55. 384 U.S. 436,444-91 (1966).
56. 372 U.S. 335,344-45 (1963).
57. 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
58. 384 U.S. 11, 16-18 (1966).
59. Richard Nixon, Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination of the Republican Na-
tional Convention (Aug. 8, 1968), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3537
#axzzllSqYLW00.
No. 2]
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than "judicial activists" to the Court.6° In the discourse of the time, a
strict constructionist was a judge committed to judicial restraint. In a few
short years, Nixon appointed Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, and William Rehnquist.61 Although these Justices varied over
time in their adherence to "strict constructionism," their presence soon
transformed the Court, leaving the vision of the Warren Court in its
wake.
IV. CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The change in the Court's role since 1968 has been dramatic. In the
twenty-five years between 1968 and 1993, Republican presidents made
twelve consecutive appointments to the Supreme Court.62 According to
research by Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner, in 1968
the average voting record of the five most liberal Justices (Marshall,
Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Warren) in civil liberties cases was 0.195.63
(This is on a scale in which .000 is the most liberal and 1.000 is the most
conservative.) 64 The swing Justice was Earl Warren, whose voting record
was 0.232.65 By 1993, after twelve consecutive Republican appointments,
the average voting record of the five most conservative Justices (Thomas,
Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy) was 0.758, and the swing
Justice, Kennedy, had a voting record of 0.600.66 Thus, the Court majori-
ty was nearly as conservative in 1993 as it had been liberal in 1968. Even
more striking, by 1993 the "liberals" on the Court were almost as con-
servative as the "conservatives" on the Court in 1968.67 The movement
to the right has continued in the years since 1993, with President Bush
II's appointment of Justice Alito to succeed Justice O'Connor.68
But what does "conservative" mean in the modern era? In Nixon's
time, the term meant a Justice committed to judicial restraint. Judicial
restraint is, of course, critical to the legitimacy of constitutional law. In
general, the courts must defer to the reasonable judgments of the elected
branches of government. But although judicial restraint in appropriate
60. Sidney S. Ulmer, Supreme Court Justices As Strict and Not-So-Strict Constructionists: Some
Implications, 8 L. & SOC'Y REV. 13, 13 (1973).
61. THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
146 (2006).
62. Supreme Court Historical Soc'y, Supreme Court Nominations, 1789 to 2010, http://www.
supremecourthistory.org/html/SupremeCourtAppointments.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
63. E-mail from Lee Epstein, Professor, Gould Sch. of Law, Univ. of S. Ca., to Zachary Johns,
Executive Editor, Univ. of 11. Law Review (Sept. 22, 2011, 05:18 PM CDT) (on file with author).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The four conservatives in 1968 (Harlan, White, Stewart, and Black) had an average voting
record of 0.521, whereas the four liberals in 1993 (Stevens, Souter, Blackmun, and White) had an av-
erage voting record of 0.436. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations,
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381,402-03.
68. See id. at 401-02.
[Vol. 2012
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circumstances is essential, its sweeping, reflexive invocation would abdi-
cate a fundamental responsibility that the Framers themselves entrusted
to the judiciary and would therefore undermine a critical element of the
U.S. constitutional system. It is no more appropriate for judges to refuse
to enforce the Constitution against intolerant or overreaching majorities
than it is for the President to refuse to defend the nation against enemy
invasion.
Perhaps recognizing that a theory of unbounded judicial restraint is
constitutionally irresponsible, political conservatives next came up with
the modern theory of "originalism." First popularized in the 1980s,
originalism as promoted by Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas presumes that courts should exercise judicial restraint unless the
"original meaning" of the text mandates an activist approach.69 Under
this theory, for example, it is appropriate for courts to invoke the equal
protection clause to invalidate laws that deny African Americans the
right to serve on juries but not to invalidate laws that deny women that
same right because that was not the "original meaning" of the equal pro-
tection clause.7"
Originalism, however, is fundamentally flawed. First, because those
who enacted the broad foundational provisions of our Constitution often
did not have any precise and agreed-upon understanding of the specific
meaning of "freedom of speech,"71 "due process of law,"7" "regulate
Commerce ... among the several States,"73 "privileges or immunities,""
or "equal protection of the laws,"75 it is difficult if not impossible to know
with any certainty what they did or did not think about concrete constitu-
tional issues. As a consequence, judges purporting to engage in
originalist analysis too often project onto the Framers their own personal
and political preferences. The result is an unprincipled and often patent-
ly disingenuous jurisprudence. There is no evidence, for example, for the
claims advanced by originalists that the original meaning of the equal
protection clause prohibited affirmative action or that the original mean-
ing of the First Amendment guaranteed corporations a constitutional
right to spend unlimited amounts of money to dominate the election of
69. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1-4 (2011); Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE
43,43-45 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
70. See Robert H. Bork, Judge, Speech at the University of San Diego Law School (Nov. 18,
1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 69, at 83, 88-89 (arguing that an interpretation of the equal protec-
tion clause stating that it guarantees black equality and no more is an appropriate one).
71. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpreta-
tion?, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 908 (2009) (observing that the meaning of freedom of speech can be
debated even among originalists).
72. See BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 69, at 144.
73. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
10t, 105 (2001) (stating a disagreement with other scholars over the original meaning of the commerce
clause).
74. See BENNETT & SOLUM,supra note 69, at 22.
75. See id. at 144.
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public officials. Both of these claims, however, are central to today's
conservative constitutional agenda.
The second problem with originalism is even more disqualifying, for
it reveals the theory to be internally incoherent. Originalism asserts that
those who crafted and ratified our Constitution intended the meaning
and effect of their handiwork to be limited to the specific understandings
of their time. But this view erroneously attributes to the Framers a nar-
row-mindedness and short-sightedness that belies their true spirit. In
fact, the Framers were visionaries. They were not timid men. As Justice
Louis Brandeis observed more than eighty years ago, the Framers be-
lieved "courage to be the secret of liberty."76 The conservative version of
originalism ignores that those who framed our Constitution were men of
the Enlightenment who were steeped in a common-law tradition that
presumed that just as reason, observation, and experience permit us to
gain greater insight over time into questions of biology, physics, econom-
ics, and human nature, so too would they enable us to learn more over
time about the content and meaning of the principles they enshrined in
our Constitution. Indeed, the notion that any particular moment's un-
derstanding of the meaning of the Constitution's broad and open-ended
provisions should be locked into place and taken as constitutionally de-
finitive would have seemed completely wrong-headed to the Framers,
who held a much bolder and more confident understanding of their own
achievements and aspirations.77
For these reasons, the conservative doctrine of "originalism" has
been largely discredited as a serious method of constitutional interpreta-
tion. This is not to say, however, that the views of the Framers are irrel-
evant. To the contrary, their values, concerns, and purposes, as reflected
in the text of the Constitution must inform and guide the process of con-
stitutional interpretation but in a principled and realistic manner. They
must be considered as the Framers themselves understood them-as a
set of general principles and aspirations, rather than as a collection of
specific and short-sighted "rules." To be true to the Framers' Constitu-
tion, we must strive faithfully to implement the Framers' often far-
sighted goals in an ever-changing society. That is central to any theory of
principled constitutionalism.
V. CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM
This brings me back to Citizens United. If conservative Justices ad-
hered to either their judicial restraint or originalist conceptions of judi-
cial review, they would surely have upheld the law at issue in Citizens
United. Certainly, under an approach embracing judicial restraint and
76. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
77. See BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 69, at 124-25 (stating that those who wrote the provi-
sions of the Constitution could not imagine some issues we have faced).
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deference to the elected branches of government, the Court would have
had to uphold the challenged provisions of BCRA. Only by invoking a
high degree of judicial scrutiny and aggressively second-guessing the
judgments of Congress and the President could the conservative Justices
justify their position in Citizens United. Similarly, any Justice attempting
seriously to employ an originalist analysis in Citizens United would also
have had to uphold the legislation. There is no credible reason to believe
that the Framers of the First Amendment understood the Amendment as
guaranteeing a right of for-profit corporations to spend unlimited
amounts of money in order to shape the outcomes of the U.S. political
process."8
How, then, could the five conservative Justices have invalidated the
challenged law in Citizens United? The answer, of course, is simple.
John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and
Samuel Alito are committed neither to judicial restraint nor to
originalism. Rather, like the liberal Justices of the Warren Court, they
employ a form of selective judicial activism. It seems clear, though, that
these Justices would have joined few, if any, of the Warren Court deci-
sions I listed earlier. But despite the conservative rhetoric about "strict
constructionism," "originalism," "judicial restraint," and "call[ing] balls
and strikes,"79 the current conservative Justices are just as activist as their
liberal predecessors-but in a wholly different set of cases.
In a series of aggressively activist decisions, the current conservative
Justices have held unconstitutional affirmative action programs,0 gun
control regulations,' limitations on the authority of corporations to
spend at will in the political process,81 restrictions on commercial adver-
tising,83 laws prohibiting groups like the Boy Scouts from discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation,84 the environment, violence against
women, age discrimination, federal legislation regulating guns,85 and poli-
cies of the state of Florida relating to the outcome of the 2000 presiden-
tial election. 6
78. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-52 (2010) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Nominee to be C.J., U.S. Supreme Court).
80. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701,747-48 (2007).
81. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570,636 (2008).
82. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900,917.
83. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375-77 (2002).
84. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).
85. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162, 173-74
(2001) (environment); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 627 (2000) (violence against
women); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67, 91-92 (2000) (age discrimination); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (guns).
86. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
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The challenge is to figure out what theory of judicial review or con-
stitutional interpretation drives this particular form of activism. Al-
though one can readily discern the specific conception of judicial review
that undergirds the Warren Court's judicial activism, which was clearly
rooted in the concerns of Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton about ma-
joritarian dysfunction, no similar principle or constitutional methodology
explains the jurisprudence of contemporary conservative judicial activ-
ists. To understand the Warren Court's use of judicial activism, all one
needs to do is to look at the results and then ask, "Why these cases and
not others?" The answer, as we have seen, is quickly apparent. But if
one attempts the same inquiry about the decisions of the current con-
servative Justices, no principled explanation emerges for their version of
selective activism. Rather, to paraphrase Justice Frankfurter's critique of
an earlier generation's judicial activism, the selective activism of the cur-
rent conservative majority seems to be born out of "their prejudices and
their respective pasts and self-conscious desires. "87 The point, in other
words, is that judicial activism itself is neither inherently good nor inher-
ently bad. It is a legitimate and essential method of constitutional inter-
pretation-when used in appropriate circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where, then, does that leave us? Is there any way for courts to in-
terpret the vague and open-ended provisions of the Constitution in a
principled and sensible manner? As I have suggested, the central ques-
tion should focus on when courts should give deference to the elected
branches of government and when they should be more skeptical of the
outcomes of the majoritarian political process. It is only by answering
that question that we can begin to come to some coherent and principled
theory of constitutional law.
The best answer to this question, or at least a really good first an-
swer, was offered by the Court in Carolene Products. In footnote four,
the Court rightly identified the primary circumstances in which judicial
activism (by which I mean a muscular interpretation and application of
the Constitution) is most appropriate.88 As the Framers understood, we
most need the judiciary to intervene when there is a serious risk of ma-
joritarian dysfunction-when there is a systematic danger that the ma-
joritarian political process has gone awry and when there is therefore a
need for some independent tribunal to step in and seriously questions the
judgments of the political branches. As we have seen, in Carolene Prod-
ucts, the Court identified two such circumstances -when there is a risk of
87. Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and
the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DuKE L.J. 71,
105.
88. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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political capture and when the majority disadvantages citizens who have
traditionally been given the short end of the stick in the political pro-
cess.89 And as we have seen, the judicial activism of the Warren Court
largely mirrored these two concerns.'
What, though, of the current conservative majority? Conservative
Justices and politicians repeat endlessly that, in the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, they are strict constructionists who apply
rather than invent the law. They are originalists. They are judicially re-
strained. They just call balls and strikes. But as we have seen, Citizens
United, and a host of other similarly activist decisions in recent years,
cannot be explained or justified with any of these clich6s. What, then, is
going on in these cases?
To answer that question, we need to step back and do the same
thing with the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts that I suggested earlier
about the Warren Court. That is, we should look at the outcomes and
identify those cases in which the conservative Justices tend to be judicial-
ly restrained and deferential and those in which they take an activist ap-
proach. If we do that, we discover two obvious patterns. First, the con-
servative Justices have generally been very deferential in cases in which
minorities (whether African Americans, Hispanics, gays and lesbians,
women, religious minorities, or persons accused of crime) challenge the
constitutionality of government action that disadvantages them.91 But
these are precisely the cases in which activist judicial scrutiny is most ap-
propriate. Second, as we have seen, these same Justices have generally
been most active in protecting the interests of corporations, commercial
advertisers, gun owners, whites challenging affirmative action programs,
the Boy Scouts when they claim a First Amendment right to exclude gay
scoutmasters, and George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election. 92
These patterns cannot plausibly be explained by considerations of
either judicial restraint or originalism. Moreover, they are patterns that
cannot be explained in any principled manner. These results can only be
explained as the product of personal and ideological preferences about
such matters as guns, corporations, gays, commercial activity, religion,
and George W. Bush. This is, to say the least, a worrisome state of af-
89. Id.
90. See supra Part III (discussing the Warren Court).
91. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1972-73 (2011) (Justices Rob-
erts, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito voting to uphold a state law disadvantaging illegal immi-
grants); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-60, 2265 (2010) (Justices Roberts, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, and Alito voting to narrow Miranda rights); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818,
1824 (2010) (Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito voting to uphold the installation of
a cross on public property over the objections of members of minority religions); Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124,130, 168 (2007) (Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito voting to narrow a
woman's right to abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justic-
es Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting from a decision protecting the rights of gays and lesbi-
ans); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-67 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia dis-
senting from a decision protecting the equal protection rights of women).
92. See cases cited supra notes 80-86.
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fairs because at the same time that conservatives have managed to
hoodwink the American people into believing that they are being princi-
pled, restrained, and originalist, they are in fact importing their own idio-
syncratic values and beliefs into constitutional law in an aggressive and
unprincipled manner.93
93. Having said this, I should add that, in my view, strict scrutiny was appropriate in Citizens
United because BCRA posed a significant risk of capture by those in control of the political process, at
least by possibly protecting the interests of incumbents.
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